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Legal Services in the Doha Round
Sydney M.
I.

CONE

III*

INTRODUCTION

As a subcategory of professional services and a sub-subcategory of business
services, legal services, when supplied transnationally, are the subject of negotiation in
the current round of multilateral trade negotiations known as the Doha Round.
Although this is the first round to be held under the aegis of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), as distinguished from its predecessor, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it is the second round of multilateral trade negotiations
to involve services generally and legal services in particular. The Uruguay Round
(1987-1993), under the aegis of the GATT, created not only the WTO but also the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 1 Both the WTO and the GATS
came into effect on 1 January 1995, and the latter, upon corning into effect, contained
specific commitments and other provisions relating to legal services-as well as other
categories of services-that had been negotiated and agreed to during the Uruguay
Round by countries that became WTO Members.
Because, in terms of economic magnitude and political heft, legal services,
relatively, have not figured prominently under the GATS, they are not expected to
be a major factor in the Doha Round. Moreover, that round is not expected to be
concluded for some time, and past experience suggests that legal services will figure
only in an ancillary fashion in the overall process of negotiation-of tough
bargaining over a complex and wide variety of goods, services, intellectual

*

C.V. Starr Professor of Law, New York Law School; Senior Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.
The Doha Round was undertaken by WTO Members pursuant to a Ministerial Declaration adopted on
14 November 2001 at a Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, WT/ MIN(Ol)/DEC/1 (20 November 2001).
The GATS is Annex lB to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization as signed on 15 April
1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. Specific commitments and exemptions from most-favoured-nation treatment
relating to legal services are set out under (1) Horizontal Commitments and (2) Sector-Specific Commitments
annexed as schedules to the GATS for the respective WTO Members. The Sector-Specific Commitments for
Legal Services are found under "Professional Services'', which in turn are found under "Business Services". in
the relevant schedules. Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex lb, vols 28-:-30 (Geneva:
GATT Secretariat, 1994). The classification of services is found in WTO Services Sectoral Class1ficat1on List,
Doc. MTN.GNS/ W /120.
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property, and trade policies. 2 Even so, the negotiations on legal services that take
place in the Doha Round have considerable potential for affecting the economics
and activities of lawyers and law firms, and for influencing the content of local
professional rules governing the practice of law. This article will examine that
potential.
A key word in the preceding paragraph is "local". Legal services are rendered by
practitioners acting as individual lawyers or, more frequently in the context relevant to
this article, as members or employees of law firms. These practitioners are licensed by
local authorities under local rules that have their genesis in local tradition and
experience. Although concepts relating to international trade in legal services can be
abstracted into. terminology and categories compatible with the GATS-compatible,
that is, with concepts derived from the jurisprudence of multilateral trade-the
regulation of the legal professions of the world is, in reality,,intensely parochial. It is
this parochialism that gives legal services a certain singularity i~ the Doha Round, and
that must be understood at the outset before one can evaluate the potential of the
Doha Round in respect of legal services.
Indeed, as one considers the implications of parochialism for multilateral trade
negotiations concerning legal services, one at some point will almost inevitably ask
oneself, is it useful to include legal services in the Doha Round? After all, a round of
WTO-sponsored negotiations is aimed not so much at the particularized governance
of diverse legal professions as at commercial products which, whatever their source,
are by their very nature rather fungible and free from heterodoxy. Thus, a
companion question arises: Are there not, for legal services, useful alternatives to an
undertaking such as the Doha Round? This article will examine both sides of these
questions, and will suggest that (notwithstanding the force of certain arguments to
the contrary) the Uruguay Round, for better or for worse, may already have
prejudged the answer. That is, legal services having already been included in that
'i:ound as a (sub-sub-) category under the GATS, to decide now to exclude legal
services from the Doha negotiations could, at a minimum, create an appearance of
retrogression and protectionism unhelpful to the cross-border practice of lawunhelpful, that is, to lawyers and law firms engaged in that practice and, perhaps of
even greater relevance, to their clients.

2 According to the WTO, in 2000 the value of world exports of all commercial services was USS 1, 435
billion, and the value of world exports of all merchandise was USS 6,186 billion. The WTO broke down these
torals into major categories, but legal services do not constitute one of those major categories: <www.wto.org/
english/[-]res_e/statis_e/ its2001_e/ chp_ 4_e.pdf>. National data for legal services present a special problem
because the data (a) do not distinguish between legal services (i) performed in a home country for the benefit of
clients in other countries and (ii) performed in host-country establishments, and (b) probably also do not
distinguish between fees and reimbursed expenses. See Sydney M. Cone, III, International Trade in Legal Services
(Boston: Little Brown, 1996), at 1: 19 (analysis oflegal-service data released by the US Deparonent of Commerce) _
(hereinafter "Cone 1996"). As discussed in this article, legal services performed in host-country establishments
constitute the principal category of legal services at issue in the Doha Round. On the ancillary nature of legal
services in the Uruguay Round, see Cone, as above, at 2:12-13, 2:42-44 (apparent rrade-off involving US legal
services and Japanese semiconductors).
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This article reaches this answer after examining a somewhat complicated
landscape.
. First, it asks which WTO Members are the major suppliers and users of legal
services; in this connection, it will focus on the European Union and the
United States, and their respective bilateral and multilateral interests.
Next, it considers arguments involving the globalization of legal practice, and
the interests of countries viewed, on the one hand, as the beneficiaries of, and,
on the other hand, as the targets of, globalization.
Third, it sets out and analyses the proposition that the Doha Round
negotiations should abstract legal services into categories of professional
arrangements, and should then attempt to foster agreements framed in terms
of formal categories deemed susceptible of incorporation into schedules of
GATS commitments.
Fourth, it examines the possibility, under the GATS, of taking a lesser or
parallel step known as developing multilateral professional disciplines, rather
than seeking to negotiate full-blown agreements based on national schedules
of specific commitments.
Finally, on the basis of the review and analysis thus conducted, the article
attempts to reach a balanced conclusion to the question: Is it helpful to include
legal services in the Doha Round?

II.

MAJOR CROSS-BORDER SUPPLIERS AND USERS OF LEGAL SER VICES

Legal services are included under the GATS (which, as its name indicates, is an
agreement on trade in services) as though they were an item of trade being imported
into and exported from WTO Member countries. 3 In the case of legal services, this
concept is a sometimes confusing fiction, and in practice the fiction is often ignored.
Instead, the practice that evolved in the Uruguay Round was for the essential
negotiations on legal services to focus on rights of establishment (and rights ancillary
thereto) that law firms seek and, where available, assert and implement outside their
home countries. For this purpose, the relevant WTO Member countries are home
members and host members. A law firm's home member is the country in which the
firm is present, conducts a substantial and regular legal practice, and is treated by the
firm itself as its home country. A host member in respect of that firm is any WTO
Member country, other than the firm's home member, in which the firm establishes or
.seeks to establish itself for the purpose of supplying legal services. Accordingly, in the
area oflegal services, the Uruguay Round focused on the rights of home-member law
firms to create establishments in host members, and to staff those establishments with
lawyers from, among other places, the relevant home member.
3

_See, generally, Laurel Terry, CATS' Applicability to Transnational Lawyers and its Potential Impact on Domestic
ef U.S. Lawyers, 34 Va!1derbilt J. Transnational L. (2001), 989; see Cone, as note 2 above, at 5-6.
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The European Union and the United States are the leading WTO Members in
terms both of supplying legal services through establishments in host members, and
using legal services supplied by establishments oflaw firms from other home members. 4
That is, EU and US law firms are leaders in establishing themselves outside their home
countries, and the European Union and the United States are leading centres of legal
practice that include establishments of non-home-member law firms. In this sense
(employing the fiction that legal services are imported and exported), it can be said that
the European Union and the United States are leaders as· both importers and exporters
of legal services.
Cross-border legal practice is hardly confined to EU and US law firms. There are
host-country establishments in many other WTO Members, of which China; Japan,
Hong Kong and Singapore are notable examples. Moreover, countries such as
Australia, Brazil and Canada are WTO home members. that both permit the
establishment of law firms from other home members, and b-ave their own homemember law firms whose operations include establishments in other host members. 5
As has been mentioned, the European Union and the United States are not only
the leading host members, but also the leading home members; thus, they have legalservice establishments in other host members, including, importantly, each other. One
not surprising consequence of this comparability of the European Union and the
United States is the existence of concessions that they would like to obtain from each
other in the area of legal services. Given their predominance in this area, it might be
thought that, as between themselves, the European Union and the United States
would simply enter into bilateral negotiations with a view to agreeing on mutual
concessions. Here, however, two critical factors must be taken into account, one
involving domestic regulation of legal practice, the other involving the GATS, each
fundamentally affecting legal services in the Doha Round.
1. The regulation of the legal profession, including the regulation of foreign
lawyers, is uniform neither within the European Union nor within the
United States. This lack of uniformity has major implications for
transnational rules on legal services.
2. An essential rule under the GATS is the requirement of most-favourednation (MFN) treatment. In the absence of an expressly agreed exemption
from MFN treatment, a WTO Member must accord all other WTO
Members treatment no less favourable than that accorded the WTO Member
receiving most-favoured treatment from the WTO Member in question.

4

See WTO Council for Trade in Services, Background Note, S/C/W/43, at 8 (no. 28).
See the entries for these countries in Martindale-Hubbell International Law Directory (New Providence:
Martindale-Hubbell/ Lexis, 2002).
5
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THE EUROPEAN UNION

Variations in the legal systems of the 15 countries that are members of the
European Union have been the subject of detailed commentary.6 The§e variations
account for the protracted negotiations that were necessary until, in 1998, the
7
European Union adopted an Establishment Directive in respect of legal services.
The 15 EU member countries are required to implement the Directive by
appropriate national measures.a To the extent that the Directive has been
implemented, it creates a system under which a duly licensed legal practitioner from
any EU home country is entitled to establish himself or herself in every other EU
country. Under the Directive, the practitioner thus established in an EU host country
is aut~orized, using his or her home-country professional title, · to provide legal
services relating to home-country, host-country and third-country law. Additionally,
such a practitioner, after having been established in an EU host country for a certain
period of time, is entitled to. qualify, at his or her option, as a member of a legal
profession in the host country. An analogous, although somewhat more qualified,
right of establishment is also conferred by the Directive on law firms (as distinguished
from individual lawyers). Here, in many cases, the Directive enables a law firm from
an EU home member-country to establish itself in EU host member countries. The
Potential qualifications of this right of establishment relate to (a) possible general
restrictions in the host country with regard to legal practice by law firms, and (b)
possible restrictions where the law firm is not entirely controlled by nationals of the
15 EU member countries. 9
The European Union's Establishment Directive expressly confines the individual
rights thereunder to nationals of the 15 EU countries. 10 Thus, a legal practitioner from
a non-EU country, even if he or she qualifies as a member of a legal profession in an
EU country, is not entitled to the benefits of the Directive. It seems most unlikely that
this aspect of the Directive will be changed. In theory, the United States might attempt
to reach a bilateral agreement with the European Union whereby every US national
Who qualified as a legal practitioner in an EU country would be entitled to the benefits
of the Directive. Such a bilateral agreement, it might be argued, would be far more
beneficial to the US legal profession than potential benefits to be attained pursuant to
the Doha Round.
There are, however, rather serious impediments to achieving such a bilateral
result. First, the EU member countries encountered considerable difficulty over a long
6

E.g., Cone, as note 2 above, chs 7-11.
·
.
Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 15 February 1998! to facilitate practice
0 f the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which qualification was
0 btai~ed, OJ L077 (14 March 1988), at 0036--0047 (hereinafter "EU Directive").
. .
.
E
. France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have yet to adopt national legislation 1mplement1ng the
U Drrectlve; the 11 other EU M ember States have adopted such legislation.
~ The respective provisions of the EU Directive referred to in this paragraph are Articles 2, 5.1, _1~;3, an? l 1.
This results from the defimuon oflawyer in Article 1.2(a) of the EU Directive as one who ts a national
of a Member State".
7
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period in negotiating the Establishment D irective just among tbcmsclve , 11 and they
might lack the political will to embark on the further intra-EU negotiations that would
be required in order to extend the D irective to non-E U nationals. Second, as discussed
below, it would probably prove difficult for the United States to put itself in a position
where it could offer to the European Union advantages for EU legal practitioners
established in the United States of a type that the European Union would deem a
suitable counterpart for granting rights under the Directive to US practitioners
established in the European Union. Finally, as mentioned above, there is the matter of
MFN treatment, meaning that the E uropean Union and the United States could not
simply enter into a bilateral agreement without either extending its benefits to all
WTO Members, or else granting trade concessions that would permit them
successfully to claim an MFN waiver for legal services in the Doha Round
negotiations.
Another bilateral objective that the United States might seek from the European
Union outside the Doha Round is the repeal of the EU's doctrine under a decision by
the European Court of Justice, known as the AM&S case, whereby client
communications to lawyers in the European Union may not benefit from attorneyclient privilege if the lawyers are not qualified EU legal practitioners. 12 This distinction
between EU and non-EU legal practitioners established in the European Union,
which accords attorney-client privilege in the case of the former but not the latter, and
thus gives a competitive advantage to the former as compared with the latter, has much
vexed US law firms established in EU host countries.13 The abolition of this distinction
could conceivably be the subject of a bilateral arrangement between the United States
and the European Union. Even so, this limited objective, it might be argu ed, could
equally well be dealt with in a multilateral agreement on attorney- client privilege
entered into in the context of the Doha Round.
As a practical matter, however, it might prove impractical to focus the many
participants in the Doha Round in an effective manner on the discriminatory
implications of the AM&S case, whereas US bar associations are quite focused on this
issue and are probably well positioned to lobby for it to be dealt with in bilateral EUUS negotiations. If the United States were successful in such negotiations, the result
might be unilateral action by the European Union applied generally for the benefit of
11 See Roger Goebel, lAwyers ill tlte E11ropeat1 Community: Progress Towards Commu11ity-Wide R ights of Practice,
15 Fordham Int'! L. J. (1991-92), 556; Heinz Weil, The Proposal for a Directive on the R igltt of Establishmetitfor
lAwyers i11 the E11ropean Comm1111ity, id., at 699; see Cone, as note 2 above, at 8:12- 8:26.
12• AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission, Case 155179 (18 May 1982), Common Market R eports §8757. In
that case the staff of the European Commission, in the course of investigating alleged antitrust violations, had
requested documents that AM&S Europe Limited had refused to provide on the ground of attorney-client
privilege involving in- house counsel. The Commission rejected the claim of privilege, and the issue was brought
before the European Court ofJustice which, in dictum, observed that "written communications between lawyer
and client must apply without distinction to any lawyer entitled to the practice of his profession in one of the
Member States, regardless of the Member State in which the client lives''. This dictum has been cited as authority
for the proposition that, in the EU, communications by clients to non-EU lawyers are not privileged.
13 The ABA H ouse of Delegates, in February 1983, resolved that a client should enjoy the same privilege in
respect of communications with a U S lawyer that the client enjoys in communications with an EU lawyer.
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non-EU legal practitioners established in the European Union. Thus, while the
AM&S issue is one that the United States has been pressing and is likely to continue
to press to have resolved, its resolution in a manner favou~able to non-EU legal
practitioners would seem to depend on unilateral decisions taken within the
European Union itself
Finally, judging from unofficial indications of what the European Union will be
~eeking in the Doha Round with respect to legal services, its focus may be less on
unproving access in the United States for EU law firms than on raising the level of
multilateral commitments in order to gain access for EU law firms in countries with
restrictive policies on the right of establishment. Korea and other Asian countries, for
14
example, and possibly certain Latin American countries, may fall in this category. As
for the United States, quite a few EU law firms are well established there, especially in
New York, and some of these establishments are substantial in size .and effectively
operate as though they were domestic US firms. ts While there are ways in which the
United States might further penefit EU firms, improvements of this sort may seem
rather marginal when compared to the lifting of barriers in restrictive jurisdictions
through multilateral negotiations.

B.

THE UNITED STATES

The practice of law is regulated by the several states of the United States. Great
disparity exists among the states as regards the treatment of non-US legal practitioners
established, or seeking to become established, in a particular US state. In the
(theoretical) event of bilateral EU- US negotiations on legal services, the United States
Will perforce need to take these disparities into account and thus might not find it easy
~o speak in a meaningful way with a single voice on behalf of all of the US states
including those where protectionist rules apply to the practice oflaw.
The United States is represented in the Doha Round by the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), which in turn, as regards legal services, looks for guidance to
the American Bar Association (ABA)-a large, voluntary association of lawyers. In
anticipation of the Doha Round, the ABA adopted a resolution endorsing its 1993
14 See
documents made . available 17 April 2002 at <http://www.guardian.co.u~/Print/
0th38S8,4395515,00.html> (providmg 29 non~pubhc European Conmussion documents, designated MD. 040/ 02
rough MD: 0.68/02 (6 March 2002), settmg out GATS requests from the EU and m Member States to,
~spect1vely, India, Ca?ada, the United Sc:ites, Australia, N ew Zealand, the Philippines, Switzerland, Colom~m,
Banama, Malaysia, Pakistan, Smgapore, Chma, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea_, Indonesia, Thailand, Argentma,
S tazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Egypt, Israel, South Africa, Mextco). With regard to the. Uruted
tates, there have been suggesttons that all US jurisdictions showd adopt the ABA's Model Rule for the Licensmg
~~Legal Conswtants (August 1993).- See, e.g., Jonathan Goldsnlith, US. doors remain close.d to foreign lawyers,
lJ ropean Lawyer Gune 2002), .24. Gtven the substantial presence and scope of practice of !ore1gn law firms m _the
1ted States, examples of wh1ch are referred to in the following footnote, these suggesnons may be susceptible
0
m;~rpretation as def~nsive EU posturing for purposes of the Doha Round.
.
.
See, e.g., the lisnngs for Allen & Overy, Clifford Chance, Freshfields Bruckhaus Dermger, Lmklaters,
~ells m 12 Martindale-Hubbell I.Aw Directory (New Providence: Martindale-Hubbell/Lexis, 2002) at, respectively,
C75B-78B, NYC262B-283~, NYC503B-504B, NYC877B-878B, NYC888B-889B.

t
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Model Rule on Foreign Legal Consultants. 16 The substantive relevance of this
endorsement in the context of the Doha Round not being immediately apparent, an
effort at explaining its relevance is set out in the immediately following paragraphs.
The ABA Model Rule is a virtual copy of legal-consultant rules which w ere
originally adopted in the State of N ew York. (The 1993 ABA Model Rule tracks the
New York legal-consultant rules as adopted in 1974 and subsequently amended.)
Looked at on the basis ofNew York's legal-consultant rules, the ABA Model Rule can
be interpreted in light of almost 30 years of experience and jurisprudence developed in
New York. Viewed in isolation outside New York, however, the ABA Model Rule is
far less meaningful. Most of the states of the United States do not have any legalconsultant rules, and most of the US states that have adopted legal-consultant rules
have not adopted key provisions of the ABA Model Rule. In other words, when the
ABA Model Rule is compared with the rules of all of the states of the United States, it
takes on the character not of a model that has been widely followed but of one that is
largely precatory.
The "legal consultant" concept was adopted by New York to facilitate granting
foreign law firms a right of establishment in New York. Thus, lawyers in a foreign law
firm could be licensed as "legal consultants" without examination (that is, without
having to qualify as members of the New York Bar) to practice law in New York, and
this right, combined with (a) the right to associate (as partners or otherwise) with N ew
York lawyers, and (b) the right to advise on home-country, host-country and thirdcountry law, constitut~d a meaningful right of establishment for foreign law firms
located in New York.17 This right is not found in most US states, however, where the
legal-consultant rules, if any, have not followed the N ew York/ABA Model Rule
pattern of permitting licensed legal consultants to advise on host-country law and to
create host- country legal practices. T hus, were bilateral EU- US negotiations to occur,
the Europea n Union might w ell question wh ether the United States was in a position
16

l\.eso lutio n o f lhe AUA 1 lo us o f I) leg:it s, 1:: cbru::.ry 2002 , st:aing tha t lhc ADA " suppo rts neg ti:itio n

pro posals co the United States Trade H..eprcsencativc regarding access to fo re ig n nurkeu for U S lawye rs thro ugh

permanent establishments consistent with, and as expressed and incorporated in, the ABA's 'Model Rule for the
Licensing of Legal Consultants' in the United States". (The ABA's Model Rule was adopted by the ADA H ouse
of Delegates in August 1993 and has not been modified. Although 24 US jurisdictions have legal-consultant rules,
most of them differ materially from the ABA's Model Rule. See Cone, as note 2 above, ch . 4.) See also ABA
Section of International Law and Practice, Report 113E ro the Ho use of Delegates (3 February 2002). Although,
at the time this article went to press, the United States had not anno unced its position on legal services in the
Doha Round, it is expected that that position will be based o n (1) the ABA's Model Rule, and (2) the common
positio n of N ew York bar associations referred to in the next footnote.
17
R.ulcs of the New York Court of Appeals, Part 521. On the basis of these rules and over 28 years of
experience thereunder, the New York State Bar Association and the Association of the Dar of the C ity of New
Yo rk, in April 2002, adopted a commo n position on the Doha Round negotiations on legal services. Briefly, this
common position called for a multilateral right of establishment in host countries for lawyers and law firms from
home countries, entitling the establishment (1) to comprise home-country, host-country and third-country
lawyers, and (2) to supply legal services (a) w hich the lawyer or law firm was entitled to supply in the home
country, and (b) relating to the law of the host country if, where appropriate, the services were based on the
services of host-country lawyers who could be lawyers within the establishment itself. This common positio n was
endorsed by the Legal Services Committee of a US trade group, the Coalition of Service Industries. For this
common position, see Sydney M. Cone III, New York and Legal Services in N egotiations Under the General Agreement
011 Trade in Services (Geneva, 19 July 2002; on file with the WTO Secretariat) .
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to grant EU law firms a meaningful right of establishment throughout the United
States. More precisely, the European Union might question the breadth of the
mandate ertjoyed by the USTR in the area oflegal services.
Three other aspects of the US position in such hypothetical bilateral negotiations
should be mentioned:
1. Even in New York and in the ABA Model Rule, there are limitations on the
rights of legal consultants that, in the age 'o f the Doha Round, may seem
antiquated. Legal consultants in New York are subject not only to restrictions
involving appearances in that state's courts, which must be the active
responsibility of members of the New York bar or of lawyers specially
admitted by the court, but also to restrictions involving (1) transfers of title to
real property in New York, (2) family law matters relating to US citizens, and
(3) the preparation of documents in New York governing inheritance under
New York law by US citizens. 18 These last three restrictions were deemed
politically necessary .some 30 years ago in order to deal with protectionist
opposition to the adoption of New York's legal-consultant rules. Other US
states have copied these restrictions and, in a number of cases, have added to
them. Perhaps the New York restrictions are so entrenched and are so limited
in nature that they have become immutable. Their retention, however, might
provide the European Union with negotiating points in the event bilateral
EU-US negotiations on legal services were to occur.
2. In 2001, New York adopted rules on multidisciplinary practice (MDP) that
limit MDP in New York to contractual arrangements between lawyers and
certain non-legal professionals, and that forbid the latter to have an ownership
or investment interest in, or otherwise to control, a legal practice in New
York. 19 In certain EU countries, however, MDP. is not subject to these
strictures. It is conceivable, therefore, that issues relating to MDP could
complicate bilateral negotiations between the European Union and the
United States on legal services, although it seems more likely that rules on
MDP would be excluded from such negotiations and left to the discretion of
local regulatory authorities.
3. The states of the United States are just beginning to develop rules on
multijurisdictional practice (MJP) among the several US states. In August
2002, the ABA adopted a resolution on MJP which, so far as non-US law
18
Id., § 521.3.
19 New York Lawyer's Code of Professional R esponsibilitv Disciplinary Rules 1- 106, 1- 107. For the
relev
.,, Committee on the Law _Goverrung
·
F'irm
S ant b ackground ~eport, see N ew York State Bar Association
Mtru~turi: ~nd Oper~tlo?, Report on Preserving tire Core Uilues of tire American Legal Profession: The Place of
S ultidisaplmary Practice m tire Law Governing Lawyers (April 2000). For subsequent US Federa! _law, see the
A~banes-Oxley Act of2002, § 2_01(a), adding, inter a/ia, new§ (g)(S) to Section 10A of the S~cunues Exchange
on t of 1934. In the European Uruon, the European Court ofJustice has held that rules adopted m th~ Netherlands
of MOP, rules which are not dissurular fro~ the New York Rules on MDP, are not incompatible with the Treaty
OrRome. J CJ. VV<>uters,]. W. Savelberglr, Pnce Waterhouse Belastingadvise1m B V v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse
de van Advocaten, EC] C-309(99 (19 February 2002).
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firms are concerned, does little except, once again, commend the 1993 ABA
Model Rule on Legal Consultants to the attention of the several US states
and, in addition, suggest that they look favourably on temporary "fly-in, flyout" visits by foreign lawyers. By itself, the ABA resolution on MJP does little
to promote the right of establishment of foreign law firms in the United
States, and this factor might not escape.the attention of EU negotiators in the
event of bilateral EU-US negotiations on legal services. 20
In sum, bilateral EU-US negotiations on legal services would appear to be a
problematic substitute for the multilateral Doha Round. Even so, many of the
considerations set forth above relating to hypothetical bilateral EU-US negotiations are
hardly irrelevant in the multilateral context and may manifest themselves, directly or
indirectly, in the course of the Doha Round. Because law firms from the European
Union and the United States are predominant in seeking rights of establishment and
because international legal centres in those two countries tend ~o set the pace as regards
granting rights of establishment to law firms from other home countries, EU-US
interaction on legal services, even if they do not ripen into formal bilateral negotiations
as such, may prove to have a significant influence on how the Doha negotiations in
fact proceed.
Ill. LEGAL SER VICES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD GLOBALIZATION

The predominance of the European Union and the United States in the area of
legal services rather predictably gives rise to arguments that have become familiar in a
more general setting with respect to globalization and the WTO. Detractors of the
WTO often claim that it is a creature of multinational enterprises reaping the benefits
of globalization primarily for industrialized nations. 21 With regard to the GATS, its
critics have suggested that its principal beneficiaries are major providers of services
based in industrialized countries, seeking access to markets in developing countries in
order to keep the latter in a state of economic subordination. 22 The undeniable fact
that law firms with global ambitions and capabilities are to a great extent based in
industrialized nations makes it superficially tempting to include legal services among
the services claimed to be part of an effort to exploit the GATS for the benefit of more
industrialized countries seeking expansion if not domination in countries that are less
industrialized.
It should be recognized, however, that the role of law firms, even of global law
firms, as facilitators of globalization, is rather different from the role of the clients of

20 The substance of the ABA position on MJP is found in Report ef the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice
(ABA, August 2002).
~
21 See, e.g., articles posted on <http://www.prospect.org/issue_pages/ globalization/> esp. Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Globalism1 Discontents. See also Center for R esearch on Globalization: <http:/ / www.globalresearch.ca/>.
22 See, e.g., Jeff Faux, A Deal Built on Sand, 111e WT01 Recent Doha Meeting is a Fast Track to Chaos: <http:/
/ www.prospect.org/ print/ Vl 3/ 1/ faux-j.html> .
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law firms. It is the clients that constitute the business, commercial and financial engines
of globalization. Their economic muscle is the driving force that has wrought a
globalized economy. To the extent that they need lawyers to facilitate their activities
they will find them, whether in home countries or host countries or third countries,
whether by retaining firms of lawyers or by hiring individual practitioners or by
creating corporate in-house teams of lawyers. True, once a governmental authority or
a non-governmental organization or a private enterprise concludes that the net effect
of globalization is harmful or pernicious, it (the opponent of globalization) will
probably be inclined to reason that there is no compelling reason to distinguish
between clients and their lawyers. This may seem a mighty fine distinction in the mind
of a person for whom globalization poses a threat that must be tempered or avoided.
Failure to make this distinction may serve, however, to mask the essentially
protectionist agenda of a number of opponents of rights of establishment for law firms
from other countries. The primary effect of denying this right to foreign law firms is
not to stem the progress of globalization-it indeed may have scant effect on the forces
of globalization-but to shelter domestic legal practitioners from competition. The
practice of law is highly competitive, particularly where the clients are engaged in
global business, commerce or finance. Here, the typical lawyer-client relationship is
?ne in which the lawyer is the supplicant, the anxious caretaker of the relationship, and
in which the client is quite free to choose among potential suppliers of legal services.
Clients, moreover, stand to benefit when they are able to choose among a broad
sp_e ctrum of potential suppliers, domestic and foreign. It is the local bar, not the local
client, that is likely to sound the alarm that foreign lawyers are coming, to decry the
consequences of globalization for national culture, and to insist that the intruders be
repulsed or, at least, tightly controlled.
This protectionist phenomenon in the area of legal practice is not uniquely a
function of attitudes toward globalization, and protectionism in the legal profession is
not confined to jurisdictions in the less-industrialized world. 23 Certain member
countries of the European Union and certain states of the United States have rules that
effectively restrain competition by establishments of foreign lawyers. This type of
parochialism antedated the era of globalization, and is a useful indicator of the nature of
some of the forces at work when a local bar raises the threat of globalization as a reason
for erecting barriers against the creation of meaningful rights of establishment for law
finns from other countries.
It should also be recognized that the exclusion of foreign law firms from a
Particular jurisdiction may be self-defeating. The professional skills that clients seek in
major cross-border transactions may tend to gravitate toward centres of international
Practice in other jurisdictions, and legal work relating to the protectionist jurisdic~ion
rnay in fact be done in such a centre in another jurisdiction. This result could handicap
the development of the legal profession in the protectionist jurisdiction, and effectively
2

'

See Cone, as note 2 above, at 1:16-17, 1 :20.
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cause an outflow of legal work to localities that afford a right of establishment to
foreign firms and that thereby receive the professional stimulus of competition among
a variety of firms.
In addition, it should be recognized that domestic professional organizations may
lack the political power to maintain protectionist policies over a long period. Clients
seeking the benefits of a multiplicity of providers of legal services may become
impatient with local bar groups attempting to curtail competition, and governments
may find that, in the interests of clients and in the context of multilateral trade
negotiations, it is desirable or at least expedient to provide greater cross-border access
to establishments of law firms from other countries.
All of this said, it cannot be denied that an observer who begins the Doha Round
with an anti-globalization perspective is likely to include legal services in the category
of services that should be denied new opportunities for expansion. Such an observer
will almost certainly notice that the strongest promoters of new opportunities for the
expansion oflegal services in the Doha Round are law firms whose home countries are
among the world's more industrialized nations. It would therefore seem predictable
that anti-globalization forces will react by resisting the creation of robust rights of
establishment for these firms.

IV.

THE PROPOSED ABSTRACTION OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE DOHA ROUND INTO
FORMAL CATEGORIES

The suggestion has been made by Australia24 and by the International Bar
Association25 that legal services in the Doha Round might be usefully analysed by
abstracting them into formal categories of legal practice and the regulation of legal
practice. This intellectual exercise, it is said, will enable WTO Members, in dealing
with legal services under the GATS, to categorize different types of legal services and
regulatory systems and, having done so, to ascertain rather readily the areas in which
they may be prepared to make specific commitments. For example, it might be argued
that, if a WTO Member were willing to license foreign lawyers as legal consultants
authorized to advise on home-country (but not host-country) law, that a M ember,
through a process of abstraction, would readily find the vocabulary that is appropriate
for a specific commitment to that formal category oflegal services.
Well intentioned though this approach might be, its practical effect might not
prove very helpful if the objective of the Doha Round in respect oflegal services is to
move WTO Members toward less restrictive regimes through the creation and
recognition of meaningful cross-border rights of establishment for lawyers and law
24 WTO, Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Commrmicationfrom Australia-Negotiatillg ProposalfQ!
Legal Services, Doc S/ CSS/ W /67 (28 March 2001), supplemented and revised by Suppl. 1/Rev. 1 (10 July 2001).
25 International Bar Association, Legal Services Under CATS, Briefing Paper for the WTO (Geneva, 19 July
2002). See also Russell Miller and Scott Gallacher, The CATS Framework and Trade in Professional (Legal) Services,
paper presented at 24th International Trade Law Conference, Canberra, Australia, 9 October 2002.
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finns. Indeed, the practical effect could easily be regressive where the terminology of
decontextualization was employed to camouflage protectionist measures. An all-tooPossible result is that host-country protectionist interests will be assisted in refining
their opposition to meaningful cross-border rights of establishment for law firms from
other countries, and that the fruits of decontextualization will be a menu of
opportunism from which protectionist interests in various countries will pick and
choose those aspects of legal practice concerning which they are, and, more to the
point, are not, prepared to facilitate rights of establishment. As regards the example
rnentioned above, a WTO Member that decides to license legal consultants and to
authorize them to advise on home-country (but not host-country) law does not need
an abstract developed elsewhere in order to do so. In taking such a step, the member
~eeds only its own parochial policy reasons for doing so, and its own regulatory and
26
Jurisprudential setting for finding the means of doing' so effectively.
Decontextualization is of questionable utility by virtue of two fundamental
characteristics of legal-service negotiations:
the essential issues are few in number and simple in concept, and are not
clarified by formalistic abstraction;
when these issues are dealt with in real terms, they are dealt with locally on the
basis of local arrangements locally arrived at.
The second of these characteristics rather basically informs the first. Local issues
are rarely expressed in abstracted GATS-speak. Being, at bottom, issues arising under
local rules whose language is that of the relevant locality and whose meaning is to be
found in large part in local history and jurisprudence, they require an exercise
altogether different from that of formalistic reference to abstract categories. Rather
than create the artifice of a universal menu of regulatory terminology, the legal-service
negotiators would be well advised to undertake the painstaking task of loo kin~ at _the
regulation oflegal services one jurisdiction at a time, in the actual, individual, histoncal
and jurisprudential framework of each jurisdiction. Only in this manner can the
negotiators obtain an understanding of how the regulation of legal services actually
operates.
There are certainly issues that can be identified as commonly arising in host
jurisdictions; but (as mentioned above) they tend to be few in number and simple in
concept. They relate to rights of establishment for foreign lawyers and law firms in the
relevant host country, and, in this context, usually can be reduced to the right of a~
establishment to provide legal services involving the law of the host country· Once this
26

The Australian effort at decontextualization (see note 24 above) is generally favourable to liberalizing trade
but it nonetheless would (i) prevent the Australian establishments of non-Australian law firmJ
.. m advising on Australian law on the basis of advice given by Australian lawyers within those establishments,13an0 f
~u) require such establishments to refer to Australian law firms all matters involving Australian law. See §
buppl. 1/Rev: 1, cited in note ~4 above_(~dvice given by a foreign practitioner on Australian law must be ~xl're~sl{s
fi ased c;m advice by an Australian pract1ttoner not employed by the foreign practmoner). No such resmctto
):;und m the ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants, see§ 4(e) thereof, or Part 521 of the New
Ork Rules, see§ 521.3(e) ther~of, referred to in notes 16 and 17 above.
.

~legal services,

42

JOURNAL Of WORLD TRADE

simple issue has been recognized and used as the touchstone for a given jurisdiction,
decontextualized abstraction can be dispensed with, and negotiations can proceed
efficiently.
This issue often subsumes an establishment's permitted scope of practice, and the
right of association enjoyed by, or denied, the legal professionals within the
establishment. Scope of practice invariably comes down to rules that permit or forbid
non-host-country lawyers to provide legal services involving the law of the host
country. Right of association invariably has its nexus in the ability of host-country,
home-country and third-country lawyers to associate within the establishment. More
precisely, are they entitled (1) to become partners in or employees of non-hostcountry lawyers and firms having establishments in the host country, and (2) as
members of the legal staff of such an establishment, freely to provide legal services in
their capacity as host-country legal professionals?
Other issues of potential importance are the right of the establishment to practice
under its home-country name, the legal form that the establishment may take, and the
right of home-country lawyers to use their home-country titles. These issues seem to
create obstacles, however, only in countries that are restrictive in regard to scope of
practice and right of association. In other words, such questions as those of firm name,
legal form, and the title to be used by home-country lawyers seem to be troublesome
only in jurisdictions that are otherwise restrictive in regulating the right of
establishment, and may be little more than somewhat gratuitous topics seized upon in
those jurisdictions in order further to qualify the right of establishment.
It might be added that, universally, host-country establishments are subjected to
the professional disciplinary rules applicable to domestic lawyers and firms in the host
country. In a sense, this regulatory feature serves to ratify the host country's
commitment to rights of establishment for lawyers and firms from other countries,
because it places them on a professional footing identical to that of domestic lawyers
and firms in the host country. Only where the rules are significantly harsher for
establishments of foreign firms than for the domestic profession do they put in question
the host country's genuine commitment to rights of establishment.
Jurisdictions aspiring to the status of major centres of international practice are
likely to adopt rules favourable to non-host-country firms with host-country
establishments seeking to render legal services involving host-country law. It will
follow that rules on scope of practice and on rights of association will be shaped in a
manner permitting these establishments to supply such services. It will also follow that
rules on other topics will avoid gratuitous restrictions of a formal or procedural nature.
In contrast, jurisdictions prey to local protectionist interests are likely to shape
their rules so as to inhibit competition by establishments of lawyers and law firms
having home countries other than the host country. The protectionist phenomenon~
may take many forms, but the protectionist motive is not hard to identify, and where it
prevails in multilateral trade negotiations such as the Doha Round, the invariable
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upshot is a refusal to make specific commitments on legal services that are favourable to
~stab_lishments entitled to render legal services involving host-country law. The picture
IS essentially that simple, and it seems unlikely to become more limpid when viewed
through a patina of decontextualized terminology.
~

V.

GATS ALTERNATIVES TO SPECIFIC C OMMITMENTS ON LEGAL SERVICES

Ordinarily, WTO Members negotiating with regard to services under the GATS

~so negotiate with regard to non-GATS items (industrial goods, agricultural products,

Intellectual property, trade policies) included in (to take the current example) the Doha
Roun'd. Trade-offs between Members with regard to unrelated items may therefore
occur. Accordingly, the importance assumed by legal services may be measured by its
Utility as a trade-off in other areas (which need not necessarily involve services at all).
Thus measured, legal services may be of relatively minor importance in the Doha
Round. As a result, there quite possibly will be several WTO Members that make no
specific commitments in respect of legal services, or whose specific commitments on
legal services represent less than vigorous efforts to facilitate host-member rights of
establishment for lawyers and law firms from other WTO home members. Such, at any
rate, was the experience in the Uruguay Round.
Under the GATS, there are potential alternatives to the scheduling of specific
commitments on legal services by WTO Members. One alternative is to treat the legal
Profession as a "discipline" in respect of which Members who are so inclined will
rnutually agree on specified professional rules and standards. As long as a mutualrecognition agreement is open to all Members willing to adhere to it, it has legitimacy
under the GATS. 27 Not inconceivably, the Doha Round will be the occasion for
~eveloping such a mutual-recognition agreement on legal services. Experience to date
IS not extremely encouraging, however, and suggests either that efforts to reach such an
agreement will be less vigorous than negotiations for full-blown specific commitments
~y WTO Members; or that, if they produce such an agreement, it will be one phrased
in terms of generalities that put to one side the hard regulatory questions affecting
cross-border legal practice.28
One requirement under the GATS is that every WTO Member must make it
Possible for legal professionals from other WTO Members to requalify as legal
Professionals in the Member State in question.29 Thus, in a given WTO Member,
there must exist procedures whereby legal professionals from all other WTO
Members can become candidates entitled to qualify for the legal profession of the
\VTo Member in question. This is a rather minimalist requirement, forbidding a
restriction based solely on nationality. Hence, it is legitimate for requalification to
27
GATS Article VII.
28 See International Bar Association, CATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services, a handbook (London:
I
nternational Bar Association, May 2002), at p. 35.
29
GATS Article VI(6).
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subject candidates from other WTO Members, even when they are already qualified
legal professionals, to the same requirements imposed on nationals of the WTO
Member in question who are not qualified legal professionals. These requalification
requirements may involve educational prerequisites, examinations, and linguistic
facility that, singly or cumulatively, are not easily coped with by candidates from
other countries, and that may prove irksome for those legal professionals who have
years of experience as duly licensed legal practitioners.
It is possible that the subject of requalification by legal professionals will be
discussed in the Doha Round, and that an effort will be made to remove some of the
more irksome strictures imposed in various WTO Members. As a general matter, those
WTO Members that tend to favour a meaningful right of establishment for lawyers
and law firms from other countries also tend to make requalification relatively
accessible. Where the right of establishment is the subject of favourable rules,
requalification is likely, also, to be the subject of favourable rules. 30 As a consequence,
multilateral negotiations on requalification may not prove to be a useful substitute for
negotiations on the right of establishment. Indeed, the opposite may be true, and it
may turn out that progress in the area of requalification will follow once significant
results have been obtained in multilateral negotiations on the right of establishment.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Through a process of elimination and after the various arguments have been
weighed, a tentative conclusion, which may provide the basis for a more definitive
conclusion as the Doha Round unfolds, can be reached at this stage, to the effect that
legal services have been properly included in the Doha Round. The weighing of
arguments will be found below. The process of elimination takes account of the four
topics discussed above, and does so in the following manner.
When compared with other WTO Members, the European Union and the
United States are in a class by themselves, both as host-member users of legal
services supplied by establishments of law firms from other WTO Members,
and as the creators of legal-service establishments in other host members.
Much of their predominance as both users and creators of such establishments
rests on the many EU legal-service establishments in the United States, and the
many US legal-service establishments in the European Union. It might
therefore be tempting for the European Union and the United States to
exploit their predominance by undertaking bilateral negotiations instead of
participating in the multilateral Doha Round. Such a bilateral approach does
not appear particularly promising, however, upon examination of (a) the

30 E.g., Qualified Lawyers Transfer Regulations 1990 governing the qualification of foreign lawyers as English
solicitors; § 520.6 of the Rules of the N ew York Court of Appeals, enabling foreign-educated lawyers to take the
N ew York State Bar Examination.
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disparate regulatory systems for legal services in each of the European Union
and the United States, (b) the somewhat limited bilateral concessions that each
of them might reasonably expect from the other, and (c) the concessions
involving rights of establishment that each of them may be seeking in, for
example, Asia and Latin America. With regard to the last point, there is the
further consideration that, under the GATS, bilateral concessions would have
to be extended to other WTO Members (such as those in Asia and Latin
America) on an MFN basis, unless WTO Members agreed to exempt the EUUS bilateral concessions from MFN treatment. These considerations strongly
suggest that, although the European Union and the United States are
unquestionably predominant with regard to legal services, their interests would
be better served by the Doha Round than by any bilateral arrangement within
the realm of feasibility.
It can be expected that the predominance of the European Union and the
United States in the area of legal services will provoke a negative reaction in
the Doha Round from WTO Members that question the consequences of
globalization for countries that are relatively non-industrialized. Whatever the
logic underlying this anti-globalization factor, particularly with regard to legal
services, it may represent a constant to be reckoned with in the Doha Round.
One way to reckon with it, of course, would be to exclude legal services from
the Doha Round. The basic thrust of arguments against globalization have
relatively little to do with legal services, however, as compared with other
topics of far greater economic importance being negotiated in the Doha
Round, an_d it therefore would seem altogether out of proportion to single out
legal services for exclusion. Inasmuch as issues relating to globalization
transcend the questions that will require resolution in the legal-service
negotiations, it would seem that those issues can be reasonably put to one side
in the strict context of the legal-service negotiations.
.
Efforts to adopt an abstract of decontextualized terminology through which
the legal-services negotiations will find expression seem unlikely to advance
the objective of promoting cross-border rights of establishment for law firms
in WTO home-member countries. The essence of a right of establishment
must originate not from above through a GATS-wide terminological
superstructure, but from below, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction, through local
decisions grounded in local experience and jurisprudence. Similarly,
protectionist policies inimical to such a right of establishment are of parochial
origin, and the proposed terminology can equally well be used by local
interests to mask protectionist objectives. This being said, it seems unlikely that
an otherwise propitious round of multilateral negotiations on legal services will
founder by virtue of a proposed terminological superstructure. The lesson to
be learned, it w<:mld seem, is not that the round should be abandoned, but
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that, in pursuing it, the participants should remain especially aware of the
parochial underpinnings of the topic being dealt with.
In the area of legal services, the GATS provides for possible alternatives to a
round of negotiations ending with schedules of specific commitments. Those
WTO Members that are so inclined might instead attempt to produce a
mutual-recognition agreement, or a similar understanding, setting out certain
rules and standards relating to the practice of law. Past experience seems to
suggest, however, that this type of approach tends to produce rather vague
generalities which, when all is said and done, do not compare favourably with
multilateral negotiations for schedules of specific commitments. Although the
latter may be spotty, yielding only a patchwork of rights of establishment, these
rights, once in place, are reinforced by the contractual framework of the
GATS, and by the institutional and dispute-resolution resources of the WTO.
The principal argument against incluiling legal services in the Doha Round is that
they are fundamentally parochial, deeply rooted in variegated systems of legal
education, legal values, juridical oversight, professional rules, and cultural attitudes; and
that the GATS is ill-suited to dealing with this heterodoxy of jurisprudential
parochialisms. The principal argument for including legal services in the Doha Round
is that, notwithstaniling the argument summarized in the preceding sentence, legal
services were included in the Uruguay Round and were there the subject of several
specific commitments. Admittedly, those commitments, taken together and viewed in
the context of the many WTO Members that did little or nothing in the way of
making legal-service commitments, were rather limited. The Uruguay Round
nonetheless represented a tangible beginning in the area of legal services; and a failure
to follow up in the Doha Round could rightly be viewed as a step backward, as
abandoning cross-border rights of establishment to the risks and vagaries of out- andout protectionism.
In the end, protectionism-the threat of protectionist barriers to cross-border
rights of establishment-seems to hold the key to the question of whether legal
services should be included in or excluded from the Doha Round. The argument for
exclusion is that the GATS, while an agreement aimed at eliminating protectionist
barriers, is not well suited to the parochial problems and features encountered when
dealing with rules on the supply of legal services. In brief, it can be argued that legal
services fit but awkwardly in the GATS, and the GATS must be tortured more than a
little to fit around legal services.
Once this poor fit has been recognized, explicated and regretted, the fact remains
that protectionism is the enemy of cross-border rights of establishment. This being
true, it would seem altogether desirable also to recognize that the GATS as a WTO
core agreement represents a vital multilateral force designed to roll back protectionism.
It would be a bit much to expect the WTO and the GATS to be perfectly designed for
every individual category of business and professional services, much less for so eclectic

LEGAL SERVICES IN THE DOHA ROUND

47

a sub-subcategory as legal services. Despite the imperfections that must be dealt with
when legal services are fitted into the Doha Round, that is, into the current round of
WTo negotiations, and into the applicable WTO agreement, that is, the GATS,
proponents of cross-border rights of establishment would seem well advised to think
themselves fortunate that the WTO and the GATS exist, and, accordingly, to try to
make the most of the opportunities inherent in the Doha Round.

